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 Representation of citizens by elected officials is a core principle of American democracy 
(Eulau et al. 1959; Key 1961).  Assuming the delegate approach to representation (Pitkin 1967), 
state legislative districts give voters the opportunity to elect representatives that will act in 
accordance with their wishes in the state policy arena.  The extent to which a legislator’s policy 
votes reflect his constituents’ preferences is often referred to as “policy responsiveness” (Eulau and 
Karps 1977). 
 While the make-up of the constituency shapes legislators’ positions in policy areas, 
legislative voting behavior also is indirectly influenced by personal and institutional factors.  
Previous research has found mixed effects of professionalism, term limits, and progressive ambition 
in shaping legislators’ behaviors.  The main focus of this analysis is the effects, direct and indirect, 
of institutional variables on policy responsiveness. 
 Through OLS regression and the use of National Federation of Independent Businesses’ 
legislator scores as a measure of conservatism in roll call voting, I find that responsiveness is 
influenced by institutional characteristics.  An interaction model indicates positive and significant 
effects of professionalism on responsiveness, while district competition and the ambition of the 
legislature have strong negative effects.  These effects differ for members of either party.  Both 
Republicans and Democrats are influenced similarly by the effects of district competition and in the 
same direction by professionalism and progressive ambition.  The effect of term limits, however, 
has differing effects on the partisan groups.  The effect of the political context of a presidential 
election year is also tested, but this variable is found to have no significant effect on legislators’ 
responsiveness.  The findings of these analyses indicate several institutional influences that 




 Much of democratic theory centers on the election of representatives who enact the 
wishes of their constituents.  Policy responsiveness is the extent to which legislators reflect their 
constituents’ wishes, and this responsiveness is influenced by a variety of other variables.  While 
constituency preferences do influence legislators’ voting, institutional variables may also play a 
part in shaping responsiveness.  Which institutional characteristics influence legislators’ 
responsiveness to their constituents, and to what extent do they impact legislators’ voting?  Are 
Republican and Democrat legislators influenced by different variables?  Does the surge of 
political interest and activity in presidential election years alter legislators’ responsiveness?  
Focusing on legislative professionalism, the presence of term limits, and progressive ambition, I 
test institutional characteristics’ effects on policy responsiveness, and then test institutional 













Literature Review  
 A hallmark of democratic systems is institutionalized representation.  Public officials are 
elected to represent their constituents as either a delegate, who acts solely in concordance with 
his constituents’ wishes, or as a trustee, who acts on his personal evaluation of what is in the best 
interest of his constituents (Pitkin 1967).  The delegate view of representation involves 
accountability to constituents before and after policy voting.  Constituents’ preferences are 
indicative of how the legislator should vote.  McCrone and Kuklinski (1979) add that not only 
must a representative see himself as a delegate, but his constituency must organize and express 
their preferences so the representative may reasonably estimate their opinion (280).  The capacity 
to have public opinion accounted for in decision making is a central theme in democratic theory, 
adding legitimacy and authority to policies (Eulau et al. 1959; Key 1961).   
 Miller and Stokes (1963) find that “the Representative’s roll call behavior is strongly 
influenced by his own policy preferences and by his perception of preferences held by the 
constituency.  However, they go on to say that, “the Representative has very imperfect 
information about the issue preferences of his constituency, and the constituency’s awareness of 
the policy stands of the Representative ordinarily is slight” (56).  Essentially, while the 
constituency’s preferences play a role in legislators’ roll call voting, limited information about 
the constituents’ preferences and low levels of constituency interest may result in more of a 
trustee role than delegate role.  In their analysis, Cooper and Richardson (2006) find that 
representation is often driven by institutional arrangements, and legislators tend to prefer and 
consider themselves more aligned with the Burkean trustee view of representation (189).   
 While there is some support for the trustee view of representation, the present analysis 
focuses on the delegate view.  The delegate approach holds that a legislator should estimate his 
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constituents’ preferences, and then vote accordingly.  A degree of constituency control over 
policy making is fundamental in democratic systems.  Miller and Stokes (1963) call the 
American system a “mixture” of the delegate and trustee approaches, and that the type of 
representation will likely depend on institutional circumstances and issues at hand (56).   
Additionally, an element of electoral accountability is involved in representation.  Pitkin (1967) 
concludes that the representative “must not be found persistently at odds with the wishes of the 
represented without good reason in terms of their interest” (209); through elections, constituents 
will replace legislators whom they feel are not sufficiently expressing the constituency’s 
preferences.  
Responsiveness  
 Eulau and Karps (1977) add another dimension to the study of representation.  While 
representation is often associated with policy-making, these authors note that lawmaking is only 
one component of representation.  Legislators may also be responsive through service and 
casework (Fiorina 1989; Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Johannes and McAdams 1981), 
obtaining and allocating benefits for his constituents (Fiorina 1977; Stein and Bickers 1994), and 
symbolically acting to promote trust and a relationship between the legislator and his 
constituents.  Eulau and Karps (1977) call this “policy responsiveness,” which Ardoin and 
Garand (2003) define as “the degree to which legislators reflect in their roll-call behavior the 
policy views of their constituents” (1165).  “Responsiveness” is viewed as a proactive 
assessment of constituents’ preferences, followed by action in the legislative setting, while a 
“response” is the reactive action taken after a stimulus (Eulau and Karps 1977: 249).  Therefore, 
policy responsiveness is high when a legislator’s estimation of his constituents’ preferences is 
congruent with his roll-call voting behavior.  
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 Representation through voting on policies is a very direct form of representation, in 
which legislators’ actions should be congruent with constituents’ wishes.  Much work has been 
done linking constituency policy preferences and national legislators’ voting behaviors (Erikson 
1978; Glazer and Robbins 1985; McCrone and Kuklinski 1979), as well as behaviors across 
different constituency types (Glazer and Robbins 1985; Jackson and King 1989; McCrone and 
Kuklinski 1979), and in different issue areas (Page et al. 1984; Burstein 2003).  A large majority 
of the literature revolving around policy responsiveness has dealt with Congressional districts; 
this analysis, however, uses the state legislative district as the unit of analysis. 
 On the state legislative level, the connection between legislators and their constituents 
has been less studied, and state representation theories often coincide well with theories from the 
national level.  Hogan (2004) suggests that the proximity of state legislators to their constituents 
may increase policy responsiveness.  In looking at subconstituencies, which are subsets of a 
constituency that are most likely to support a candidate, Bishin (2000) finds that constituents’ 
preferences do play a large role in legislators’ decisions and voting behaviors, and different 
levels of support and participation from voters also effect legislator voting differently.  Difficulty 
in state-level analyses stems from the availability of data on constituency preferences.  Berry et 
al. (1998) obtain reliable data on the state level, but direct measures of constituency preferences 
lower than the state level are nearly impossible to obtain, due to the number of constituencies 
and then cases needed from each constituency to construct a representative sample of the voters.   
 Another aspect in the literature surrounding representation is the ability of representatives 
to accurately assess their constituents’ wishes.  Uslaner and Weber (1979) find that legislators 
actually represent the views they perceive to be their constituents’ opinion, rather than the true 
preferences of their constituents.  Support is found for these authors’ “poorly informed elite” 
 5
theory, in which legislators build their assumptions of constituency preferences on incorrect or 
inadequate information (566).  However, in the defense of state legislators, data and information 
on state legislative districts’ policy preferences may be difficult and expensive to obtain. 
 Therefore, past research has utilized a variety of techniques to estimate policy 
responsiveness of U.S. House members and to measure constituency ideological and issue 
preferences.  The techniques most successful in measuring constituency preferences have used 
small-sample estimates of public opinion (Miller and Stokes 1963), demographic variables 
(Erikson 1978; Jackson and Kingdon 1992; Page et al. 1984), presidential election returns 
(Glazer and Robbins 1985; LeoGrande and Jeydel 1997), referenda voting (Erikson et al. 1975; 
Kuklinski 1977; McCrone and Kuklinski 1979), and ‘bottom-up’ simulations, where estimates 
are developed by extending individual-level models to the aggregate district level (Erikson 1978; 
Sullivan and Uslaner 1978; Uslaner and Weber 1979).  Essentially, the “bottom-up” approach 
takes note of individuals’ demographic characteristics, which then are related to commonly 
linked with ideological positions.  The individual-level estimates are then substituted with 
district demographics to achieve a district-level ideology estimate (Ardoin and Garand 2003). 
District-level Characteristics 
 The social diversity of a constituency has been previously found to be a reliable indicator 
of partisanship, which can easily be correlated with ideology and issue preferences.  Sullivan 
(1973) is the foundational work in this area.  The “Sullivan index” is a measure of absolute 
constituency diversity using social, economic, and religious characteristics.  Koetzle (1998) finds 
that while Sullivan (1973) measures the absolute diversity in a district, it is necessary to 
recognize the political diversity of a district and the competitive partisan impact that is the result 
of political heterogeneity.  With the premise that certain demographic characteristics favor either 
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of the political parties, Koetzle (1998) constructs a measure of political diversity and finds that 
more heterogeneous districts are more politically diverse, and that increased political diversity is 
significantly related to more competitive House elections (571).  Aistrup (2004) finds further 
support for the Koetzle approach by applying the measure of political diversity on the state and 
county level.  Here also, there is a strong positive relationship between political diversity and 
partisan competition (279).   
 Mayhew’s 1974 book, Congress: The Electoral Connection, has become a foundational 
work in the field of political behavior.  Mayhew’s theories are grounded in the assumption that 
elected officials behave strategically and rationally, with the continual pursuit of reelection.  
Reelection goals drive officials’ allocation of time and resources, policy positions, and the 
creation of coalitions, according to Mayhew (1974).  The goal of maintaining office promotes 
electoral accountability because officials must please their constituents to keep their support.  To 
win an election, an official will appeal to the largest number of voters, likely taking a moderate 
ideological position.  This “median voter theorem” has been a widely researched and used theory 
in legislative politics.  Diversity within districts increases competition because different social 
groups hope to elect a representative who will favor their interests.  However, candidates must 
appeal to several social groups in order to reach the necessary percentage of votes to win.  
Increased diversity, therefore, increases competition among candidates, who in turn, take 
moderate policy positions to earn the support of voters.   
 The struggle then comes when candidates are unable to assess the median voter’s 
preferences.  Fiorina (1974) finds that the more competitive the district, the less closely a 
candidate can mirror the preferences of the median voter.  An inaccurate assessment of voters’ 
preferences can be attributed to the multiple and mixed messages groups send to candidates.  
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Candidates’ interpretation of their constituents’ wishes may not be accurate, due to the various 
signals received.  Still, candidates will strive to represent the median voter, with hopes of future 
terms or offices.  Responsiveness, therefore, is related to competition through legislators’ 
strategic goals of pleasing constituents.    
Legislator Characteristics 
 Past research has found that legislators’ voting behaviors are influenced by a host of other 
factors besides constituency preferences.  A legislator’s personal characteristics may also 
contribute to his voting behavior.  Female legislators traditionally tend to favor liberal 
ideological views, but they are responsive to constituency preferences and demands (Poggione 
2004; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004).  Jenkins (2006) finds that while ideology does influence a 
legislator’s voting, partisanship is a more powerful influence.   
 In the political arena, Stratham (2000) finds that the longer a legislator holds his office, 
the less likely he/she will vote along party lines.  This indicates that more senior members’ votes 
may be influenced by factors other than partisanship.  Additionally, Glazer and Robbins (1985) 
find that seniority has a strong positive effect on ideological responsiveness (271), while 
McAdams and Johannes (1985) note that junior legislators are more attentive to their 
constituents and devote more time to service and casework responsiveness (1111).  The mixed 
past findings on the effect of seniority on responsiveness leads to an examination of a possible 
“freshman effect.”  Seniority is often intertwined with leadership responsibilities for the 
legislator.  Some past studies have found that with increased party or committee leadership 
responsibilities, legislators become less involved with their constituents, decreasing 
responsiveness (Johannes 1984; Bond 1983).  While these legislator characteristics are not the 
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focus of this analysis, they serve as important control variables that may play a part in a 
legislator’s responsiveness. 
Institutional Characteristics 
 Another group of variables that may influence policy responsiveness are those related to 
the characteristics of the legislature.  Different institutional characteristics may affect the extent 
to which a legislator’s voting behavior reflects his constituency’s interests.  This analysis focuses 
on three chamber characteristics: professionalism, the presence of term limits, and progressive 
ambition. 
Professionalism 
 Mooney (1995) defines professionalism as “the extent to which a legislature can 
command the full attention of its members, provide them with adequate resources to do their 
jobs…, and set up organizations and procedures that facilitate lawmaking” (1995: 48-49; Hogan 
2004: 546).  In recent years, there has been much research on the effects of legislative 
professionalism.  Squire (1992a; 2007) uses the U.S. Congress as a “baseline against which to 
compare those same attributes of other legislative bodies (2207: 212).  He compares state 
legislators’ salary and benefits, average days in session, and average staff per member to those 
characteristics of U.S. Congressmen; these components have been used in other professionalism 
measures (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000; Thompson and Moncrief 1992).  Squire (1992a; 
2007) then composes an index where higher (closer to 1.00) scores indicate a strong resemblance 
to Congress and higher professionalism.  Kurtz (1992) also constructs a classification of state 
legislatures into professional, hybrid, and citizen groups according to average salary, session 
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duration, and total staff (Hamm and Moncrief 1999). A comparison of these two measures of 
professionalism indicates a substantial amount of consistency among the states.1   
 The effects of professionalism stretch into many areas of legislative and electoral politics.  
A higher level of professionalism is related to greater incentives to serve and longer tenures, 
more opportunities to influence policymaking, and more time and effort devoted to legislative 
service (Squire 2007: 213).   Professionalism has also been found to increase contestation, or the 
number of candidates running for an office (Hogan 2004: 557).  Greater resources in professional 
legislatures may also increase service to the constituency.  For example, Squire (1993) finds that 
professionalism is positively related to legislators’ contacts with constituents.  Incumbents’ 
access to resources for travel, time for campaigning (Carey, Niemi, and Powell (2000), and 
casework (King 1991) also results in more successful re-election attempts.  
 The relationship between professionalism and policy responsiveness has a history of 
mixed findings.  Maestas (2000) notes that proponents of professionalism suggest that increased 
staff and office resources are helpful to legislators in identifying and serving the needs of 
constituents, resulting in more capable legislatures and legislators (663).  Maestas (2000) finds 
that more professionalized legislatures do, in fact, produce policy that is more congruent with 
statewide preferences (675).  Critics of professionalism argue that members of professionalized 
legislatures are insulated from the preferences of their constituents (Hickok 1992), and that 
professionalism is positively related to partisan bias, fewer strong challengers, and higher 
incumbent vote margins (Chubb 1988; Moncrief et al. 1992; Weber 1999).  Some studies show 
no significant effect, or indirect effects seen only though complex interactions (Carmines 1974; 
                                                 
1Seven states (Virginia, Louisiana, Kansas, South Carolina, Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama) are considered 
hybrid states by Kurtz (1992), while Squire (2007) finds these states to have lower index scores.  In other words, 
these seven states, considered hybrid legislatures by Kurtz, are mixed among the citizen legislatures when Kurtz’s 
categories are transposed onto Squire’s index.  The Squire index and Kurtz’s categories of professionalism have a 
correlation coefficient of .80. 
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Karnig and Sigelman 1975).  It is a goal of the present analysis to examine the interactive effect 
of professionalism and constituency preferences on legislators’ policy responsiveness. 
Term Limits 
 Term limits are a relatively new regulative addition to state legislatures.  To date, only 
fifteen state legislatures operate with their members being restricted to serving a specified 
number of years.  Several opposing viewpoints deal with the effects of term limits on legislators 
and voters.  Proponents of term limits usually follow one of two rhetorical arguments: the 
responsiveness argument or the public interest argument.  The responsiveness argument is 
couched in the delegate theory of representation, and holds that “limiting terms will foster better 
representation by legislators who are more ‘in touch’ with their constituents” (Boeckelman 1993: 
191).  Long-term legislators may become insulated and distanced from the needs and preferences 
of their constituents.  The public interest argument is developed from the trustee view of 
representation, which emphasizes legislators’ abilities to make informed decisions in the best 
interest of their constituents.  Proponents of term limits, under the public interest view, believe 
that legislators facing term limits would be less focused on reelection and more on their current 
term, that political parties will become stronger and more organized, lessening the power of 
incumbency advantage, and that seniority will have less of an effect in slowing and stalling 
needed changes within political systems (Boeckelman 1993: 193). 
 Other research pertaining to the effects of term limits suggest that with fewer experienced 
members in the legislature, power will flow elsewhere, possibly resulting in a more powerful 
executive (Boekelman 1993: 204) or more strength among interest groups (Moncrief and 
Thompson 2001).  Moncrief and Thompson (2001) also find that term limits can be linked to 
decreased legislator knowledge and increased reliance on staff, giving interest groups more 
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influence.  Boeckelman (1993) and Kurfirst (1996) note that while term limits restrict 
opportunities for career politicians, amateur legislators may be more attentive and in tune with 
their constituents’ values and preferences.  Kousser (2005) finds that term limited legislatures 
experienced a surge in legislative creativity and progress on pending policies from more senior 
members, but this progress decreases as term limits replace incumbents with new members.  
Carey, Niemi, and Powell (1998) find that term limited legislatures’ composition (legislators’ 
backgrounds, educations, incomes, ideologies) does not differ systematically from legislatures 
without term limits; however, these authors find that term limits decrease legislators’ efforts in 
securing benefits and allocations for their districts, and give higher priority to the state as a 
whole (295).   
   The relationship between term limits and policy responsiveness has been considered in 
recent literature.  In a 2006 article, Carey, Niemi, Powell, and Moncrief (2006) find that term 
limited legislators “pay less attention to their constituents- whether one judges attention by 
constituency service or by pork barreling- and are more inclined to favor their own conscience 
and the interests of the state over those over those of the district” (123).  In the same vein, 
Cooper and Richardson (2006) also find that term limited legislators are more likely to behave as 
trustees, acting in the best interest of their constituents rather than reflecting their constituents’ 
preferences.  Will (1992) suggests that the pressure for continued reelection results in term 
limited legislators being more focused on career goals rather than on representing constituents.  
However, Carey (1996) finds that term limited legislators might vote contrary to constituents’ 
preferences if they did not have to face the threat of electoral defeat; therefore, the prospect of 
reelection serves as a source of electoral accountability.  In a more recent analysis of roll-call 
voting in 99 state legislative chambers, Wright (2007) finds that “legislators serving under term 
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limits show no less correspondence with the general ideological preferences of their districts than 
legislators serving in chambers without term limits” (271).  Wright (2007) does find an 
interactive relationship between term limits and legislative professionalism on legislative 
behavior.  He finds that term limit states with greater professionalism saw lower levels of roll-
call participation in comparison to less professionalized states.  Wright (2007) attributes this 
finding to greater time constraints and demands due to the professionalism of the legislature, and 
less time relating to the constituency (271).  Therefore, the mixed effects or absence of any 
significant effects indicates that the effects of term limits on policy responsiveness are a 
relationship worthy of further analysis. 
Political Ambition 
 The availability of higher political opportunities or offices may also affect legislators’ 
electoral and voting behaviors.  Hibbing (1986) adds that ambition is best thought of as a 
psychological predisposition to work and strive for career advancement within the political 
arena.  Schlesinger (1966) suggests that potential candidates think strategically about public 
offices and possible political career opportunities.  He goes on to state: “a politician’s behavior is 
a response to his office goals…our ambitious politician must act today in terms of the electorate 
he hopes to win tomorrow” (6).  His three “directions” of ambition (discrete, static, and 
progressive) led to a body of literature which revolves around how legislators’ hopes for future 
offices affect his behavior in his current office.  Barber (1965) finds that differences that the 
activity levels and activities performed by state legislators partially depend on goals of future 
offices, while Van der Slik and Pernaciarrio (1979) conclude that senators with party or 
leadership ambitions act differently than those who are content with their current position, or 
have static ambition. Herrick and Moore (1993) find similar effects, as congressmen who have 
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hopes of leadership positions (“intrainstitutional” ambition) are more active in introducing 
legislation and on the floor, although they are less successful in passing legislation (772).  
Progressively ambitious legislators have also been found to strategically prepare for higher 
offices. For example, Francis and Kenny (1996) find that representatives may begin shifting their 
policy positions to better align with state party positions up to thirteen years before running for 
the Senate, and that their more moderate ideologies become more extreme over this preparatory 
stage (783). 
 In the question of policy responsiveness, past literature has supported the theory that 
more professionalized legislatures, with greater resources, facilitate greater responsiveness in 
progressively ambitious legislators. This finding shows that legislators with career incentives 
will use resources to be more attentive to their constituency base (Maestas 2003).  Rather than 
classifying individual legislators’ political ambition, Squire (1988a) groups legislatures into 
categories of legislatures according to the likelihood and ability of members to seek higher 
offices.  Squire (1988a) classifies twenty-five states into three categories: dead-end, career, and 
springboard.  These three groups take into account the mean age of legislators in a chamber, 
legislators’ pay and benefits, and tenure length in grouping legislatures according to the 
opportunities for political career advancement.  Maestas (2000) further develops Squire’s 
(1988a) three categories into four categories, dividing springboard states by high- and low- 
salary.  Maestas (2000) finds that professionalism, particularly salary and resources, increases 
the responsiveness of legislators in spring-board legislatures.  The author does note that this 
increased responsiveness may be the result of higher salaries allowing legislators to commit to 
their political career full-time, devoting more time and energy to their constituents (679).  
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Nevertheless, legislators who strive for higher offices or a career in politics are likely to be 
























 A hallmark of democratic systems is institutionalized representation.  The capacity to 
have public opinion accounted for in decision-making is a central theme in democratic theory, 
adding legitimacy and authority to policies (Eulau et al. 1959; Key 1961).  I assume Pitkin’s 
view of representatives as delegates: “the representative as a ‘mere’ agent, a servant, a delegate, 
a subordinate substitute for those who sent him… the purpose which sent him must have been 
the constituents’ purpose and not his own” (Pitkin 1967: 146).  As McCrone and Kuklinki (1979) 
note, the delegate perspective requires that the representative views himself as a delegate, and the 
constituencies must provide clues of their preferences to representatives (298).  The 
representative, under the delegate theory, should take note of his constituents’ preferences and 
needs, and then act accordingly in the legislative arena.   
 The extent to which policies reflect constituents’ wishes is conditioned by a host of 
factors that stem from the district, the legislator, and the legislative chamber.  It can be expected 
that a representative’s personal beliefs, career goals, and the environment into which he was 
elected could influence his level of responsiveness and the resulting policies.  An even deeper 
issue is legislator’s motivation to mirror constituents’ interests, which may include ethical 
concerns, hopes to increase constituent support, or because the legislator’s own interests are 
similar to those of his constituents.  The object of this analysis is to discover which 
characteristics increase legislator’s policy responsiveness.  Several characteristics of the 
legislator will be used as controls, isolating effects of the district and chamber on legislators’ 
voting behavior. 
 Fenno (1978) comments: “[A congressman] cannot represent any people unless he 
knows, or makes an effort to know, who they are, what they think, and what they want” (233).  A 
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legislator’s knowledge of his constituents is the first challenge in responsiveness.  While national 
polls achieve overviews of national trends in public opinion and voting habits, information from 
the state legislative districts is less available.  In general, state legislative districts cover a smaller 
geographic area with fewer constituents than congressional districts.  Relatively smaller staffs, 
limited resources and funding, and occupational commitments (even in professional legislatures) 
restrict the efforts of legislators in assessing public opinion.  It seems likely that state legislators 
would use the social make-up of their constituency as cues to their preferences.  Due to the lack 
of polling and survey efforts in state legislative districts, legislators must use shortcut indications 
of the constituency’s preferences.  Using demographic characteristics as preference indicators, 
legislators are able to reasonably estimate their constituency’s wishes.  While preferences do not 
always follow social and geographic expectations of opinion, a constituency’s demographic 
characteristics may still be used as a rough indicator of preferences. 
 Some demographic characteristics are consistently associated with an ideological 
direction.  For instance, African American voters historically prefer more liberal ideologies, and 
often vote with the Democratic Party (Tate 1993).  Per capita income is also an indicator of 
preference; areas of lower income prefer liberal ideologies, while higher income per capita 
suggests a more conservative ideology.  The percentage of voters living in urban or rural areas 
can also indicate ideological preferences; while rural voters prefer a more conservative position, 
urban voters are more liberal (Barone et al. 1998).  While demographic characteristics serve as 
indicators of preferences, constituents’ opinions are also shaped by other factors, such as 
partisanship (Jenkins 2006), issue saliency (Page and Shapiro 1983), and media influence 
(Niemi, Powell, and Bicknell 1986).   
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 A legislator’s estimate of his constituency’s preferences should directly affect how he 
votes on policies.  Maintaining the delegate approach to representation, the legislator should 
respond to constituency cues by voting to enact legislation that coincides with his constituents’ 
wishes.  A legislator’s personal beliefs and circumstances surrounding his term may have an 
indirect effect on his responsiveness.  Controlling for the indirect effects of a legislator’s 
personal ideology and partisanship, length of time in office, leadership responsibilities, and 
public interest during presidential election years will allow his true level of responsiveness to his 
constituents to be estimated. 
 Apart from constituency influences and indirect legislator characteristics, a legislator’s 
voting behavior may also be affected by institutional characteristics within the chamber.  While 
chamber characteristics are not expected to directly influence responsiveness, they may 
indirectly play a role.  Three factors that could be expected to condition a legislator’s policy 
responsiveness are professionalism, the presence of term limits, and progressive ambition, or the 
proclivity of state legislatures to act as springboard positions to pursue higher offices.  The 
effects of other factors may be magnified or diminished when an indirect chamber effect is 
involved.  While there are other institutional factors that could influence responsiveness, the 
presence of professionalism, term limits, and progressive ambition may promote greater policy 
responsiveness. 
 A characteristic that is highly predictive of legislators’ responsiveness is legislative 
professionalism.  Theoretically, legislators with more available resources and time should be 
more equipped to monitor constituents’ preferences and vote accordingly.  Greater 
professionalism in the chamber should encourage greater policy responsiveness by legislators.  
Past literature on the impact of term limits on responsiveness has produced mixed findings.  
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While term limits alone may not have much of an effect on responsiveness, this chamber 
characteristic may have a conditioning effect when interacted with other chamber characteristics 
or with constituency characteristics.  Progressive ambition can be simply defined as the 
motivation to achieve higher political offices.  Increased incentives and resources in ambitious 
chambers are strongly related to responsiveness; legislators represent their constituents well in 
hopes of continued support in other races. 
 A legislator’s responsiveness to his constituents is a foundational aspect of 
representation.  While he is accountable to his constituents’ preferences, he must also consider 
his own beliefs and goals.  Additionally, the chamber to which he is elected has institutional 
features that may increase his responsiveness to his constituents.  Professionalism, term limits, 
and progressive ambition are three chamber characteristics that should promote better policy 
responsiveness.  The extent of responsiveness to constituency characteristics may be conditioned 
by the presence of these institutional variables.  By first simulating constituency ideological 
preferences and then integrating chamber characteristics through interaction variables, I expect to 










Assumptions and Hypotheses 
 Several assumptions are made throughout this analysis.  Each of these assumptions is 
rooted in theory and past research.  I assume Pitkin’s (1967) delegate view of representation, in 
which legislators and their constituents view the role of a legislator as a conveyor of the wishes 
of his constituents, and votes accordingly.  I also assume that legislators have reasons for voting 
along their constituents’ preferences.  These reasons may be due to personal progressive 
ambition, a commitment to political service, or to simply please constituents.  I assume further 
that constituents are informed, even to a small extent, of the legislator’s behavior and will hold 
legislators electorally accountable for their voting behavior.  Constituents displeased with the 
legislator’s voting behavior or performance as a representative should consider not voting the 
legislator back into office.  Finally, I assume that constituents are, in some way, communicating 
their preferences to the legislator.  The legislator is able to interpret this communication and vote 
consistent with the preferences of the constituency.  Signals sent by constituents may be simple 
demographic groupings, written or verbal correspondence, participation in groups or group 
activities, or interest in particular issues or policies.   
 District diversity and the variety of preference messages that the legislator receives may 
influence his ability to represent his constituents.  Or, legislators may not be able to estimate the 
preferences of voters and non-voters in the constituency; it could be expected that legislators 
may cater to the preferences of voters to aid the legislator’s future reelection attempts.  I 
hypothesize that in highly competitive districts, legislators will be less able to accurately assess 
the preferences of their constituents, and will therefore be less responsive in their conservative 
voting behavior.   
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 While a variety of district and legislator variables are included in this analysis, the 
indirect effects of the institutional characteristics are the main focus.  I expect legislative 
professionalism to have a positive relationship with policy responsiveness.  As legislators have 
more resources and staff available, more active monitoring and communication of constituents’ 
preferences should result in better responsiveness.  Additionally, the salary and benefits 
legislators enjoy in professionalized legislators are an incentive to retain their office.  Term 
limits, on the other hand, are hypothesized to have a negative, relationship with responsiveness.  
A limited number of terms may reduce responsiveness, as legislators’ incentive of re-election 
decreases.  Progressive ambition is hypothesized to have a positive effect on policy 
responsiveness.  Legislators planning to develop a political career with higher offices can be 
expected to serve their local constituents well, while also working to gain the support of a 
possible future constituency.  Therefore, I hypothesize that while professionalism and ambition 
will increase policy responsiveness, term limits may have a negative effect.   
 When considering different partisan groups or year contexts, the effects of institutional 
characteristics on responsiveness may vary.  Separating Democrat and Republican legislators 
may reveal that legislators’ responsiveness, regardless of partisanship, are influenced by similar 
factors.  Or, each partisan group may vary in their influences.  The year context may also alter 
responsiveness.  I hypothesize that, in comparison to non-presidential election years, the surge in 
public attention and participation in presidential election years will encourage legislator 





Data and Methods 
 Gathering data on the state legislative level is an obstacle that has hindered the growth of 
this area in political science.  While some demographic information is available through the 
United State Census, public opinion and preferences on the constituency level is more difficult to 
obtain due to the lack of polling and surveys in state legislative districts.  Barone, Lilley, and 
DeFranco (1998) have compiled State Legislative Elections: Voting Patterns and Demographics, 
which reports demographic characteristics and trends in constituents’ political activities and 
behaviors.  Data from the lower houses of twenty-eight states between the years of 1995 and 
2000 are used in this analysis.2  These states vary on a number of dimensions: region, culture, 
legislative professionalism, and the presence of and variance of term limit regulations.  Also, 
each of these states uses the single-member district systems, which specify only one 
representative per legislative district. 
 The measurement of the chamber variables is taken from previous literature: 
professionalized legislatures as dichotomized by Kurtz (1999), and classification of 
progressively ambitious legislatures as grouped by Squire (1988a) and Maestas (2000).  Term 
limits is simply any presence of term limitations of legislators, regardless of the restrictiveness of 
the policy or length of served time allowed.   
 A series of OLS regressions are used to find relationships between legislators’ voting 
behaviors and possible variables that may play a part in influencing their vote.  I first estimate 
constituency preferences by using demographic characteristics as indicators of constituents’ 
policy preferences.  I then create three interaction variables, in which three chamber 
characteristics (professionalism, term limits, and progressive ambition) are interacted with the 
                                                 
2 The states included in this analysis are: Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
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estimation of constituency preferences.  Legislator characteristics are included and serve as 
controls for individual characteristics that may influence his/her voting behavior.  The focus of 
this analysis is to find the effect that institutional characteristics have on legislators’ voting.   
 In the first model, I regress a score of legislator conservatism in voting against estimated 
constituency preferences.  This will indicate how well legislators’ conservative voting is directly 
related to constituency preferences.  The second model regresses legislators’ conservative voting 
against constituency, legislator, and institutional variables.  Here I include a series of interaction 
variables, which will show the magnitude of any indirect effects that chamber characteristics 
have on legislator responsiveness.  A third model will separate Republican and Democrat 
legislators, to indicate any differences between the two parties’ levels of policy responsiveness 
and the factors that influence legislators’ voting behavior.  Finally, a fourth model analyzes the 
contextual effects of Presidential election years.  The greater attention and participation in 
Presidential election years could also encourage responsiveness by legislators. 
Dependent Variable: Calibrated NFIB Score 
 For the dependent variable in each of the four models, calibrated NFIB scores are used as 
an indicator of legislators’ level of conservatism, as seen in their voting behavior on business and 
economic issues.  The National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB) rates legislators 
based on the percentage of times the legislator sides with the group’s pro-business agenda on roll 
call votes.  As Hogan (2004) notes, party affiliation and district characteristics are highly 
correlated with a legislator’s NFIB rating, and NFIB scores are also highly correlated with 
similar groups’ measurements, such as the AFL-CIO and Chamber of Commerce legislator 
scores (1288-89).  I use a calibrated NFIB score, which is the difference of the raw NFIB score 
and the NFIB mean, divided by the NFIB standard deviation.  This score allows for 
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standardization across state policies, which vary in number and conservatism.  The calibrated 
NFIB score serves as an indicator of conservatism where higher values indicate legislators’ 
greater support for conservative economic and regulatory policies.  
Independent Variables 
Constituency Conservatism Score 
 The lack of polling and surveys at the state legislative district level as led to estimation 
techniques that attempt to capture the direction of constituency preferences.  Hogan (2003) 
modified the Koetzle (1998) measure of political diversity to indicate values of demographic 
characteristics that favor Democratic candidates.  Similar to Hogan’s (2003) measure of a 
Democratic Advantage score, I create a “Constituency Conservatism” score, using demographic 
characteristics to estimate constituency preferences for conservative voting.  The demographic 
characteristics that contribute to the score are grouped according to their established ideological 
tendency.  The demographic groups that historically favor liberalism are: college graduates3, 
those living in urban areas, African American or Hispanic, and those receiving Social Security.  
The demographic groups with established tendencies for conservative preferences are: 
population living in rural or suburban areas, white, and higher average annual income voters. 
  The national median percentage for each variable in state legislative districts is used to 
find the direction and extent to which a district varies from the national median.  For 
demographic variables that favor more liberal policies, I subtract the district percentage from the 
national median percentage and then divide by the national standard deviation. 
                                                 
3Previous literature has found mixed findings as to the ideological tendencies of college graduates.  Some literature 
has found that college graduates may prefer more conservative policies.  This may be due partially to the high 
correlation between income and a college degree.  I did estimate the constituency conservatism score and each of the 
models with college graduates favoring conservative policies.  However, the findings for each of the models were 
consistent, regardless of the ideological direction of the college graduate population. 
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• Liberal Demographic Variables:  National Median Percentage – District 
Percentage / National Standard Deviation 
For the group of demographic variables favoring more conservative policies, I subtract the 
national median percentage from the district percentage, and then divide by the national standard 
deviation.  
• Conservative Demographic Variables:  District Percentage – National Median 
Percentage / National Standard Deviation 
By dividing by the standard deviation, I standardize these scores, producing Z-scores that 
account for variances across states and districts.  Similar to the method used in Hogan (2003), I 
then add the percentage point differences between district and national demographic 
characteristics and divide by the number of characteristics (in this measure, there are nine 
demographic variables included).  If the difference between the district and national percentages 
favors liberalism, the difference will have a negative value; if the difference favors more 
conservative voting, the difference will have a positive value.  The result is a measure of 
“constituency conservatism,” which could be seen as an indicator of state legislative districts’ 
constituency preferences for conservatism.  This constituency conservatism score is used as an 
indicator of constituency preferences and will be interacted with chamber characteristics to 
estimate the conditioning effect of chamber characteristics on legislators’ policy responsiveness 
to their constituents. 
 The impact on competitiveness could also be reasonably expected to influence 
responsiveness.  Therefore, I include a dichotomous variable that accounts for competitiveness 
within a district.  Using the past percent of the Republican two-party vote received in the most 
recent general election, I estimate the level of partisan competition within the district.  Districts 
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where the winner received over 60% of the votes are considered uncompetitive, while districts 
where the winner received less that 60% of the votes is considered competitive.  Social diversity 
within a district is positively associated with the number of candidates running and 
competitiveness as various demographic groups vie for political influence.  While social 
diversity increases competition, it also increases the difficulty of accurately assessing 
constituency preferences.  Incorrect estimation of constituent preferences may lead to poor 
policy responsiveness. 
 Five variables are included to account for personal characteristics that may influence a 
legislator’s voting.  A legislator’s partisanship may play a part in ideological voting; voting with 
the party line often coincides with the respective ideological position.  Gender is included to 
control for variations in voting due to different tendencies in men and women.  Variances 
between junior and more senior members are included in a variable indicating the number of 
years in office.  Also included is a dichotomous variable for newly-elected freshmen legislators; 
freshmen legislators may behave differently and vary in responsiveness from more experienced 
legislators.  Differences between members in party or committee leadership also are controlled.  
The final variable accounts for the interest and conditions surrounding the election year.  These 
variables may influence how a legislator votes, but they serve as control variables, rather than the 
main independent variables in this analysis. 
 The object of this analysis is estimation of the influences of institutional variables on 
legislators’ policy responsiveness to their constituency.  Three chamber characteristics are 
included: professionalism, the presence of term limits, and progressive ambition of the 
legislature.  These institutional variables account for three characteristics of legislatures that may 
influence legislators’ responsiveness to their constituents.   
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 State legislatures’ professionalism is dichotomized by Kurtz (1999) into citizen (low 
professionalism) and professional (highly professionalized).  This measure of professionalism is 
used for consistency and simplicity across the institutional variables, which are each coded as 
dichotomous (dummy) variables. As mentioned earlier, the Kurtz professionalism variable is 
highly correlated with the commonly used Squire index of professionalism.  Six states 
(California, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) in my sample are coded as 
having highly professionalized legislatures. 
 The presence of term limits is another institutional variable that may influence 
legislators’ responsiveness to constituency preferences.  This measure is dichotomized for clarity 
of findings and ease of interpretation.  Eight states (Maine, California, Colorado, Michigan, 
Florida, Ohio, Missouri, and Oklahoma) in my sample have some type of term limitation policy.  
Each of these states has differing years of policy enactment, term length, and year of impact, in 
which the first legislator was termed out of office. For this reason, states are classified by the 
presence of term limit policies, rather than the time of impact. 
 Maestas (2000) groups state legislatures into four categories, according to their level of 
progressive opportunities and salary.  Both salary groupings of Maestas’ (2000) “springboard” 
states are found to have high levels of progressive opportunity; therefore, states from both 
springboard categories are coded to have progressive ambition.  Twelve state legislatures in this 
analysis are coded as fostering legislators’ progressive ambition: California, Florida, Illinois, 






Direct Effects Model 
 The first stage, indicated in Table 1, involves a regression of the calibrated NFIB score, 
which is the dependent variable indicating legislators’ conservative voting, and the constituency 
conservatism score, which is a measure of conservative preferences as indicated by demographic 
groups within the constituency.  This model includes legislator characteristics, which are used as 
control variables.  Finally, the three institutional variables are included to find any direct effects 
of chamber characteristics on legislators’ conservative voting behavior.   
 In Table 1, the variables included account for over 53%  (R² of 0.5359) of the variance in 
legislators’ voting behavior.  The estimated constituency conservatism score is highly significant 
and positively related to legislators’ conservative voting.  A one-unit change in constituency 
conservatism results in an increase of .024 in a legislator’s calibrated NFIB score.  Also 
significant is district competition, which too has a significant and positive relationship with 
legislators’ conservative voting.   
 Some of the institutional characteristics also have significant effects on conservative 
voting.  Professionalism has a positive effect, indicating increased conservative voting in more 
highly professionalized legislatures.  While term limits is found to have no significant 
relationship with conservative voting, progressive ambition has a negative effect.  In 
progressively ambitious legislatures, there is a decrease in legislators’ conservative voting. 
Interaction Effects Model  
 In Table 2, I test the indirect effects of institutional variables on legislators’ policy 
responsiveness.  The inclusion of district, legislator, and institutional variables slightly increases 
the adjusted R² value to .537.  Therefore, nearly 54% of the variance in legislators’ voting is 
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explained by the variables included in this indirect effects model.  The district variables included 
are the constituency conservatism score and electoral competition within the district.  The 
legislator’s personal characteristics included are: gender, leadership position (either in the party 
or in committee), partisanship, number of years served in the legislature, and freshman legislator. 
Three institutional variables are included: professionalism, term limits, and progressive ambition.   
Table 1- OLS Regression Model of Direct Effects of Variables on Legislators’ Conservative 
Voting Behavior 
         Direct Effects   
Variables Coef. T 



























































Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05 level, ** p < .01 level, *** p < .001 level 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5359,  Number of Cases   7866 
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 In order to accurately account for legislators’ responsiveness, an element of constituency 
preferences must be interacted with the explanatory variables.  I interact district competition, 
professionalism, term limits, and progressive ambition with the constituency conservatism score 
to estimate these variables’ effects on responsiveness.  The first column of Table 2 indicates 
effects of district competition on legislators’ policy responsiveness.  District competition is 
found to have a negative and highly significant effect on responsiveness.   
Table 2- OLS Regression Model of Interaction Effects of Variables on Legislators’ Policy 
Responsiveness 
                         Competition            Institutional Characteristics 
Variables Coef. T  Coef. T 































79.17***  1.371 
(.0171) 
80.00*** 
Party leadership -.0253 
(.0429) 
-0.59  -.0197 
(.0428) 
-0.46 
Committee leadership .0200 
(.0195) 
1.03  .0246 
(.0196) 
1.26 
Years served -.0003 
(.0015) 





-1.84*  -.0386 
(.0222) 
-1.74* 
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                 (Table continued) 
 30




























-31.62  -.6381 
(.0199) 
-32.10 
Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05 level, ** p < .01 level, *** p < .001 level 
Competition 
Adjusted R-Square 0.5370,  Number of cases    7866      
         
Institutional Characteristics 
Adjusted R-Square 0.5365,  Number of cases    7866 
 
 
 As indicated in the second column of Table 2, two of the institutional variables are found 
to have significant effects on legislators’ policy responsiveness.  Professionalism is found to be 
significantly and positively related to responsiveness.  In professional legislatures (compared to 
non-professional legislature), the effects of policy responsiveness variable is increased by .037, 
controlling for the effects of the other variables included in the model.  Term limits, however, 
does not reach significance, while progressive ambition has a negative effect on responsiveness.  
Two of these findings are consistent with my hypotheses; professionalism has a strong positive 
effect, and progressive ambition has a significant negative effect.  However, no support was 
found for the hypothesis concerning term limits, which I had hypothesized to have a negative 
effect on responsiveness.4 
  
 
                                                 
4 In an earlier model not included in this study, the variable indicating number of years served was significant, but 
after the inclusion of a variable for freshman, the number of years served variable lost significance.  To some extent, 
there seems to be an individual-specific freshman effect. It could be expected that the presence of term limits could 
influence legislators differently, depending on how many years the legislator has already served.  Freshmen could be 
expected to be more responsive, in hopes of increasing their re-election success, whereas more experience legislators 
may be less responsive because of term limitations.  This hypothesis was tested in a triple interaction of constituency 
conservatism, term limits, and freshmen.  However, in none of the models did this interaction reach statistical 
significance.   
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Divided Party Model 
 The strength of partisanship’s influence in the second and third models leads to another 
question: Is the responsiveness of Republican and Democrat legislators influenced by differing 
factors?  Jacobson (1989) found that Democratic candidates are responsive to national indicators 
(economy and presidential popularity), but Republican candidates are unaffected.  Romero 
(1993) finds further support that legislators from different parties respond to and are affected 
differently by different stimuli.   
 Separating Democrat and Republican legislators may reveal party-specific influences for 
policy responsiveness.  Table 3 exhibits the influences of Democrats’ and Republicans’ 
responsiveness.  Similar to Table 2, in this divided party model, I regress legislators’ calibrated 
NFIB scores against a variety of district, legislator, and institutional variables.  However, in 
Table 3, members of the Democrat and Republican parties are divided and tested separately in 
order to compare different influences between the parties. 
 In the columns for the Democrats, the interactive effects of competition, term limits, and 
ambition are all significant and negative effects.  District competition’s negative relationship 
with responsiveness may be due to either the legislators’ efforts to moderate their voting 
behavior to appeal to the median voter, or legislators’ inability to accurately estimate their 
diverse district’s preferences.   Term limits have a significant and negative effect on Democratic 
legislators’ responsiveness, indicating that Democrats’ responsiveness decreases in the presence 
of term limits.  Consistent with the interaction model and Table 2 results, Democrats are 
negatively and significantly responsive to their constituents’ preferences when the legislator is a 
member of an ambitious legislature.  
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Table 3- OLS Regression Model of Interaction Effects of Variables on Democrat and 
Republican Legislators’ Policy Responsiveness 
    Democrats          Republicans 
Variables Coef. Coef.  Coef. Coef. 



































































































Interactions      










































Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05 level, ** p < .01 level, *** p < .001 level 
In the Republican model, partisanship was dropped due to multicollinearity.  
Democrats 
Competition 
Adjusted R-Square 0.5370,  Number of cases    4025 
                            (Table continued) 
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Institutional Characteristics 




Adjusted R-Square 0.5370,  Number of cases    3923 
 
Institutional Characteristics 
Adjusted R-Square 0.5387,  Number of cases    3923 
 
 
 Similar to the findings for Democratic legislators, Republican members are also 
influenced by constituency preferences, district competition, and institutional characteristics.  
Similar to the findings for Democratic legislators, Republicans’ responsiveness is also influenced 
negatively and significantly by competition.  Variance between the partisan groups is obvious in 
the institutional interaction variables.  Republicans, like Democrats, are significantly influenced 
by term limits; however, Republicans are positively affected while Democrats are negatively 
affected by term limits.  This counteracting effect explains the insignificant finding for term 
limits in Table 2.  Term limits affect partisan groups differently, effectively cancelling out the 
significant effects of term limits when all legislators are tested together.  Fiorina (1994) suggests 
a differential effect, in which parties respond to different stimuli and influences, and this theory 
is supported by the partisan differences in the effects of term limits.   
 Unlike Democratic legislators, Republicans are not significantly influenced by 
progressive ambition.  This finding could be a career effect.  If Democratic legislators are more 
attracted to career offices and service positions, they may moderate their policy positions in 
hopes of earning a greater voter support base.  Neither partisan group’s responsiveness is 




Year Context Model  
 Finally, political circumstances and year context may play a role in responsiveness.  The 
“surge” of political interest and participation in presidential election years has been found to 
benefit the advantaged party (Campbell 1987), while voters’ midterm evaluations of legislator 
service may result in electoral losses (Campbell 1991).  Legislators who were elected in 
presidential election years, cognizant of voters’ increased attention and evaluations, may be more 
representative in hopes of maintaining electoral support.  Similar to the models including the 
direct and indirect effects on responsiveness, this model includes a dichotomous variable for 
presidential election years.  My data set includes the presidential election years of 1996 and 
2000, and the data is taken from the legislative terms leading up to the presidential election 
(1995-1996, 1999-2000).  Hypothetically, voters’ increased interest and involvement during a 
presidential campaign and election may encourage more responsiveness and hold legislators 
more accountable for their voting behavior.   
 The findings noted in Table 4 indicate that the “surge” of interest and activity in 
presidential election years does not significantly affect legislators’ responsiveness.  The 
dichotomous independent variable for presidential election year is found to be a negative and 
significant influencer of conservative voting in both the competition and institutional variables 
models.  This suggests that legislators will vote less conservatively in presidential election years.  
To estimate a presidential election year’s influence on responsiveness, I create a fifth interaction 
variable by multiplying the effects of a presidential election year and the constituency 
conservatism score.  In the competition model, this presidential year interaction variable does not 
reach statistical significance. 
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Table 4- OLS Regression Model of Interaction Effects of Variables on Legislators’ Policy 
Responsiveness, including Presidential Election Year Context Variable 
 
             Competition       Institutional Characteristics      
Variables Coef. Coef. 
District   
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Year Context    















Standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05 level, ** p < .01 level, *** p < .001 level 
Competition 
Adjusted R-Square 0.5373,  Number of cases    7866 
 
Institutional Characteristics 
Adjusted R-Square 0.5389,  Number of cases    7866 
 
 
 When the effects of presidential election years are included in the institutional effects 
model, the variables’ values only slightly differ from the original interaction model in Table 2.  
The institutional interaction variables’ values are similar to those of earlier models; 
professionalism is a positive and significant influence on responsiveness, term limits has no 
significant effect, and progressive ambition is significant and negatively related to 
responsiveness.  The dichotomous indicator for presidential election year is again negative and 
significantly related to conservative voting, and the presidential election year interaction fails to 
reach significance again.  This indicates that the political interest of a presidential election year 












 The findings presented in these analyses suggest that some institutional characteristics do 
play a part in shaping legislators’ responsiveness.  My hypotheses were that while 
professionalism and progressive ambition would have positive effects on responsiveness, term 
limits would have a negative effect.  These hypotheses are partially supported by the findings. 
 As hypothesized, district-level competition is consistently found to be a significant 
negative influencer of policy responsiveness in each of the models.  A possible explanation for 
this effect is aligned with Fiorina’s (1974) arguments.  Greater competition may be the product 
of greater social diversity within the constituency.  Greater social diversity can mean that social 
groups are sending a variety of preferences messages, making an accurate estimation of 
preferences difficult for the legislators. Another possible reason for this effect could be that in 
competitive districts, it may be unclear what groups are represented and participate through 
voting, so legislators are responsive and less accountable because it is unclear which constituents 
and which preferences they should represent. 
 Professionalism behaves in the hypothesized way, increasing responsiveness in both the 
interaction effect model (Table 2) and the year context model (Table 4).  This effect may be 
attributed to the availability of resources to legislators.  For example, increased salaries decrease 
legislators’ need for additional jobs or supplemental income, which in turn increases the time 
they have to spend monitoring constituents’ preferences.  The positive and significant effect of 
professionalism on responsiveness found here gives further support for Maestas’ (2000) findings.  
In the divided party model, however, professionalism does not reach significance, due to the 
separation of Democrat and Republican legislators.   
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 My hypothesis of the negative effects of term limits on responsiveness did not find 
support.   The effects of term limits are mixed in this study, as it is in much of the previous 
research.  However, separating Democrat and Republican legislators sheds light on why the 
effects of term limits are so elusive.  When all legislators are considered together, term limits 
does not have a significant effect on responsiveness.  The partisan separation of legislators 
indicates that while Democrats’ responsiveness is negatively influenced by term limits, 
Republicans’ responsiveness is positively influenced.  The effects of term limits are mitigated 
when both parties are considered together, resulting in the ‘no significant effect’ finding seen in 
the interaction and year context models.  This finding could also be linked to legislators’ 
ambition and career plans; if Democrats are attracted to legislative careers or service positions, 
they may be less responsive in the presence of term limits, because electoral accountability is of 
little threat when there are few opportunities for other offices.  As previously mentioned, the 
effects of term limits may vary by individual legislator and the restrictiveness of individual 
states’ term limit policies. 
 In this same vein, there is a steady finding for the negative relationship between 
responsiveness and progressive ambition.  I had hypothesized that the drive for higher offices 
would promote responsiveness through the need to develop and build a voter support base.  
However, the negative effects indicate that other relationships are active here.  First, the negative 
finding indicates that the legislator is less responsive of his immediate or current constituency.  It 
is possible that the legislator may be voting to gain the support of a larger or future constituency 
though.  If, for example, a state legislator has hopes of running for a U.S. House seat, he may 
vote in accordance to the preferences of his future constituents to establish rapport and their gain 
support in the future election.  Secondly, the opportunities for higher offices may be small, 
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reducing the level of accountability for responsiveness.  Perhaps New Hampshire is the most 
obvious state with this situation.  With 400 members in the state House of Representatives, there 
are only around thirty ‘higher’ state and federal offices to be vied for.  Therefore, a fewer 
number of higher offices and a large number of legislators can be expected to reduce electoral 
accountability and responsiveness.   
 A comparison of the influencing variables for Democratic and Republican legislators 
reveals that the two partisan groups’ responsiveness are influenced by mostly the same factors.  
While both parties’ legislators indicate similar reactions to district competition and 
professionalism, the two legislator groups’ responsiveness is influenced differently by term 
limits – term limits increase the responsiveness of Republicans but decrease the responsiveness 
of Democrats.  The responsiveness of both parties is negatively influenced by progressive 
ambition, while the relationship is only significant for Democratic legislators.  In this model 
(Table 3), the only variable differing in direction is term limits.  This effect may be due 
Democrats’ greater attraction to political or service careers, which results in less responsiveness 
and accountability in term limited situations.  If Democratic legislators place great importance on 
a career of political service, they are likely to moderate their voting behavior in order to appeal to 
a larger number of voters.  However, in term limited situations, a political career stops after a 
number of terms served.  Without the incentive of a longer political career, Democratic 
legislators may become less responsive and less accountable to their constituents. 
 In the year context model, the presidential election year variable was found to be 
negatively related to conservative voting, while the interaction variable indicated that 
presidential election years had no effect on responsiveness.  This finding can be interpreted in 
several ways.  Legislators’ responsiveness may not be influenced by the political interest surge in 
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presidential election years.  It is also possible though that voters do not hold their state legislators 
accountable or see state legislators as a part of the national political arena.  While there is no 
effect on state legislators’ responsiveness, there may be an effect for U.S. House or Senate 
members, who are more involved on the national scale.  Additionally, this finding could be 
isolated to the 1996 and 2000 presidential campaign seasons; an extended time-series analysis  



















Summary and Conclusions 
 Policy responsiveness is key to the delegate view of representation.  However, 
institutional factors may condition or alter the extent to which legislators are responsive to their 
constituents’ preferences.  In this paper, I find that chamber characteristics do play a significant 
role in shaping responsiveness.  Professionalism has strong and positive effects on legislators’ 
policy responsiveness, while the level of progressive ambition in the legislature has a negative 
effect on representatives’ responsiveness to their immediate constituencies.  Term limits have 
varying effects, depending on if the legislators are divided into partisan groups.    A partisan-
grouped model shows that Democrats and Republicans’ responsiveness is oppositely influenced 
by term limits, while the aggregated model indicates that these effects counteract each other, 
creating no effect when legislators are not divided by party.  Other than the effects of term limits, 
representatives from either party are largely influenced by similar factors.  The context of a 
presidential election year is found to not have a significant role in shaping responsiveness.
 The opportunities for future research in the area of influences on representation are many.  
Future research could consider policy and issue salience, media congruence and information 
dispersion, term limit enactment and timing of impact, and the role of interest groups and 
political activity within constituencies.  Further development in the question of the effects of 
term limits could also be couched in individual- and legislator-specific analyses, which could 
focus on legislators’ priorities and efforts given to their office at different points in their political 
careers.  While the concept of responsiveness originates from delegate representation, the strong 
influences and possible manipulation of institutional characteristics can promote or undermine 
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Appendix: Variable Measurements 
 
Calibrated NFIB score 
   Economic/business interest group’s scores for state legislators’ voting  
   records on economic and regulatory policies; higher values indicates  
   conservative voting 
 
Constituency Conservatism 
   Uses district demographic characteristics to estimate ideological   
   preferences; 5 liberal: college, Black, Hispanic, urban, receiving Social  
   Security; 4 conservative: rural, suburban, income, white.  Using the  
   national medians and standard deviations, I create a standardized score: 
   liberal demographics: national median-district/national standard deviation; 
   conservative demographics: district- national median/national standard  
   deviation.  Individual demographic variables’ scores are then added and  
   divided by the number of variables.  
 
Competition  Uses the past percent of the Republican two-party vote received in the  
   most recent general election; 100- winner’s percentage of votes, then  
   dichotomized: if winner won with over 60% of votes, coded 0 for not  
   competitive; if winner won with 50-60% of votes, coded 1 for highly  
   competitive 
 
Partisanship  Legislator coded 1 for Republican, 0 for Democrat 
 
Gender  Legislator coded 1 for female, 0 for male 
 
Length of service Number of years served 
 
Freshman  Legislator coded 1 if newly-elected freshman, 0 for incumbent  
 
Leadership  Legislator coded 1 if he was a chamber party leader  or a committee chair 
 
Presidential election year 
   Coded 1 during 1995-1996 and 1999-2000 (Presidential election years),  
   coded 0 for 1997-1998 (Non-Presidential election year) 
 
Professionalism Used Kurtz’s dichotomous categorization: 1 for highly professionalized,  
   0 for citizen; takes into account average salary, average session length,  
   and total staff; Kurtz is highly correlated (.80) with Squire’s index 
 
Term Limits  Used dichotomous variable for if state has term limits policy; 1 if state  
   does have term limits, 0 if not; no difference between    




Progressive Ambition  
   Uses Maestas’ categorization of legislatures (4 categories); grouped two  
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